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SUMMARY
The United States and European Union
(EU) share a huge and mutually beneficial
economic partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU
trade and investment relationship the largest in
the world, it is arguably the most important.
Agreement between the two economic super-
powers has been critical to making the world
trading system more open and efficient.  At the
same time, a confluence of old and new trade
disputes, entailing U.S. retaliation and EU
threats of counter-retaliation have increased
trade tensions in recent years. A final ruling
issued January 14, 2002 by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) against a U.S. export tax
benefit figures prominently in current trade
disputes, along with the EU’s failure to ap-
prove pending applications for new
biotechnology crops and the possible
imposition of U.S. steel restraints in March. 
Resolution of U.S.-EU disputes has
become increasingly difficult in recent years.
Part of the problem may be due to the fact that
the U.S. and the EU are of roughly equal
economic strength and neither side has the
ability to impose concessions on the other.
Another factor may be that many bilateral
disputes now involve clashes in domestic
values, priorities, and regulatory systems
where the international rules of the road are
inadequate to provide a basis for effective and
timely dispute resolution.
In order to build a smoother relationship,
Brussels and Washington may have to resolve
a number of these disputes and avoid an out-
break of new disputes this year. The
agreement to launch a new round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations at the WTO  trade
ministerial held last November in Doha, Qatar
has facilitated this effort. An increased desire
for U.S.- EU cooperation in the wake of last
September’s terrorist attacks could also spill
over to help moderate trade frictions. 
But the two sides must now deal with the
fall-out from the final WTO ruling that the
U.S. offshore Foreign Sales Corporation
(FSC) scheme is an illegal subsidy.  Europe
has until the end of April, 2002 to decide
whether to impose retaliatory tariffs against
what could be several billions of dollars of
U.S. exports or to reach a negotiated settle-
ment.  This dispute, combined with continuing
controversies over a 1916 U.S. dumping law
and an upcoming February decision by the
Bush Administration on imposing tariffs to
protect U.S. steel producers, has the potential
for re-igniting transatlantic trade tensions.
 
The major U.S.-EU trade and investment
policy challenges can be grouped into six
categories: (1) avoiding a “big ticket” trade
dispute associated with tax breaks for U.S.
exporters; (2) resolving longstanding trade
disputes involving protection for domestic
producers of airplanes and steel; (3) dealing
with different public concerns over new
technologies and new industries (4) fostering
a receptive climate for mergers and
acquisitions; (5) strengthening the multilateral
trading system; and (6) reaching understand-





U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick stated on February 7, 2002 that the United
States is considering filing a formal complaint against the EU in the WTO over its
moratorium on imports of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
The European Union and Japan announced on March 1, 2002 that they will give the
United States until June 30 to comply with a WTO dispute panel ruling against its 1916
Antidumping Act.  
The World Trade Organization’s highest appeals body on January 14, 2002 made a
final judgment that the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Replacement and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act  is an illegal export subsidy.  Barring a negotiated settlement, the EU
will be free to impose retaliatory duties on U.S. exports possibly in the range of $4 billion.
The amount of the retaliatory duties that can be imposed will be determined by a WTO
arbitrator, with a decision due in late April.
The European Union and Japan on January 8, 2002 called for a special meeting of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body to seek approval for trade retaliatory measures in disputes
involving a 1916 U.S. Antidumping Law and an exemption from copyright fees for music
played in public establishments.
The EU and United States agreed on December 18, 2002 on how to handle a trade
dispute the United States lost in a WTO case involving licensing of music played in public
establishments. Under the agreement, the Bush Administration agreed to seek the
authorization and funding from Congress to contribute $3.3 million to a European fund to
benefit European musicians. But the two sides failed to reach agreement on a dispute
involving U.S. implementation of an adverse WTO ruling against its 1916 Antidumping Act.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview
The United States and the European Union (EU) share a  huge and mutually beneficial
economic partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest
in the world, it is also arguably the most important.  Agreement between the two partners in
the past has been critical to making the world trading system more open and efficient.
At the same time, a confluence of old and new trade disputes, entailing U.S. retaliation
against EU trade and EU threats of counter-retaliation,  increased trade tensions in 1999 and
2000.  Last year  the EU’s rejection of a merger between General Electric and Honeywell and
a World Trade Organization (WTO) was a prominent new dispute.  And in January 2002, a
combination of disputes involving the U.S. offshore tax subsidy, the 1916 U.S. Antidumping
Law, and the possibility of the imposition of higher U.S. steel tariffs, have  further increased
trans-Atlantic trade tensions. 
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In order to build a smoother relationship, the two trading powers may have to resolve
a number of these disputes and avoid an outbreak of  new disputes this year.  The agreement
reached to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the November WTO trade
ministerial in Doha, Qatar has facilitated this effort. Congress in its response to both EU
practices and Bush Administration initiatives will play a key role in managing the U.S.-EU
economic relationship. 
Closer Economic Ties
The United States and the European Union share the largest bilateral trade and
investment relationship in the world.  Annual two-way flows of goods, services, and foreign
investment transactions now exceed $1 trillion. Viewed in terms of goods and services, the
United States and EU are each other’s largest trading partners.  Each purchases about one-
fifth of the other’s exports of goods and about one-third of the other’s exports of services.
And much of the trade in goods is increasingly in high-technology and sophisticated product
areas where incomes and tastes are the primary determinants of market success.
Based on a population of some 377 million citizens and a gross domestic product of
about $7.8 trillion (compared to a U.S. population of 284 million and a GDP of $9.9  trillion)
in 2000, the fifteen members of the EU provide the single largest market in the world.  Given
the reforms entailed in the introduction of the European single market in the early 1990s,
along with the introduction of a single currency, the euro, for twelve members, the EU market
is also increasingly open and standardized. Over the next decade, with a possible  enlargement
to 27 countries,  the EU market could become even more important as a destination for U.S.
exports and investments. 
 
 The fact that each side has a huge investment position in the other’s market may be the
most significant aspect of the relationship.  By year-end 2000, the total stock of two-way
direct investment reached $1.37 trillion (composed of $802 billion in EU investment in the
United States and $573 billion in U.S. investment in the EU), making U.S. and European
companies the largest investors in each other’s market. This massive amount of ownership
of companies in each other’s market translates into an estimated 3.5 million Americans who
are employed by European companies and an equal number of EU citizens who work for
American companies in Europe. 
Growing Strains
Given the huge volume of commercial interactions, it is commonly pointed out that trade
disputes are quite natural and perhaps inevitable. While the vast majority of two-way trade
and investment is unaffected by disputes, a small fraction (often estimated at 1 percent) of the
total often gives rise to controversy and litigation. Historically, with the possible exception
of agriculture, the disputes have been handled without excessive political rancor.
Over the past several  years, however, trade relations are being strained by the nature
and significance of the disputes.  The EU Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, stated on
November 20, 2000 that the “problems seem to get worse, not better.” Richard  Morningstar,
the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, said in a January 23, 2001 speech that the inability of our
two sides “to resolve our list of disputes, which are growing in both number and severity, is
beginning to overshadow the rest of the relationship.”   Moreover, some of the efforts at
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dispute resolution have led to escalation and “tit-for-tat” retaliation with the potential to harm
the multilateral trading system.
In 1999 the United States imposed punitive tariffs on $308 million of EU exports of
mostly higher value-added agricultural products such as Danish ham and Roquefort cheese.
This action was a response to a refusal by the EU to change its import regimes for bananas
and hormone-treated beef which the World Trade Organization (WTO) determined to be in
violation of world trade rules.  EU pique over U.S. pressures on bananas and beef, in turn,
led the EU to threaten retaliation against $4 billion dollars in U.S. exports that the WTO
found in violation of an export subsidy agreement.  In addition, the EU has filed numerous
WTO dispute resolution petitions alleging that a variety of U.S. trade laws violate
international obligations in some technical fashion, contributing to an impression that  these
challenges are part of a concerted EU strategy to weaken or gut U.S. trade laws.
The underlying causes of the trade disputes are varied.  Some conflicts stem primarily
from traditional demands from producer or vested interests for protection or state aids. Other
conflicts arise when the United States or the EU initiate actions or measures to protect or
promote their political and economic interests, often in the absence of significant private
sector pressures. Still other conflicts are rooted in an array of regulations that deal mostly
with issues that are considered domestic policy. 
Resolution of these disputes has proven difficult in recent years.  Part of the problem
may rest in the fact that the EU and United States are of roughly equal economic strength and
neither side has the ability to impose concessions on the other.  Another factor may be that
numerous new disputes involve clashes in domestic values and priorities where the
international rules of the road are inadequate to provide a basis for effective and timely
dispute resolution. (For further discussion, see CRS Report RL30732, Trade Conflict and the
U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship.)
Current Trade Agenda
The United States and European Union have a full plate of high profile bilateral disputes
this year.  Several of the disputes may need to be resolved and new potential disputes avoided
if the bilateral trade strains are to be contained and a smoother trade relationship is  to
develop.  Moreover, progress on the bilateral front could provide a foundation for the two
trading giants to make progress in efforts to begin the process of multilateral trade
negotiations as prescribed by the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
At the top of the list of bilateral disputes is the FSC case.  On the basis of the January
14, 2002 WTO ruling that the U.S. FSC offshore tax provision is a prohibited subsidy, the EU
has claimed it is entitled to just over $4 billion in “countermeasures.” The U.S. has argued the
figure should be $956 million, with the final amount to be determined by a WTO arbitrator
in late April. EU retaliation on U.S. trade anywhere within the  magnitude of the range of
these two figures could risk the break-out of a trade war, with significant damage to a fragile
world economy.  While the EU has clearly stated it wants compliance and not retaliation, it
is unclear whether the Administration and Congress could  achieve compliance in a timely
fashion. The FSC dispute is joined by disputes over the 1916 U.S. Antidumping Act, an
upcoming U.S. decision due March 6 on whether to provide protection to the domestic steel
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industry, and continuing EU failure to approved pending applications for new biotechnolgy
crops. 
  
Major Issues and Policy Challenges
Major EU -U.S. trade and investment issues and policy challenges can be grouped into
six different categories: (1) avoiding a “big ticket” trade dispute; (2) resolving two
longstanding trade disputes; (3) dealing with disputes involving new technologies or
industries; (4) fostering a receptive climate for mergers and acquisitions; (5) strengthening the
multilateral trading system; and (6) accommodating trade-related foreign policy sanctions. A
summary and status update of each challenge follows.
Avoiding A “Big Ticket” Trade Dispute
Perhaps the most serious trade dispute that currently clouds  the bilateral relationship
deals with tax breaks for U.S. exporters.  If not managed properly, it could lead to a massive
disruption of trade and a major increase in political tensions.
U.S. Tax Benefits for Exports.1    The controversy between the European Union
(EU) and the United States over U.S. tax benefits for exports has been simmering for  years.
Since 1984, the U.S. tax code provided an export tax benefit known as the Foreign Sales
Corporation (FSC) provisions, which enabled U.S. exporters to exempt between 15% and
30% of their export income from U.S. tax.  According to Internal Revenue Service data, FSC
was used in connection with almost half of U.S. annual exports of goods.  In 1998, however,
the EU lodged a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the
United States’ FSC tax benefit was an export subsidy and was, therefore, in violation of the
WTO agreements. 
An aspect of the controversy concerns why the EU waited almost 14 years to challenge
the U.S. tax provision. While EU officials maintain they never formally agreed that the FSC
was legal, many on the U.S. side suspect that the challenge had much to do with EU pique
over U.S. challenges in the WTO to the EU’s import regimes for beef and bananas. Winning
a case that involved a large amount of trade may also have been seen by some Europeans as
providing significant negotiating leverage that could be used to settle other trade disputes as
well.  The EU responded that the challenge was prompted by an effort to level the playing
field, but there is little indication that European companies, with the possible exception of
Airbus, were proponents of the challenge.  
  
In October 1999, a WTO panel issued a report that essentially upheld the EU’s position.
An appeal by the United States was denied, and, under WTO procedures, the United States
had until October 2000, to bring its tax system into WTO-compliance or face possible
retaliatory measures by the EU. 
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In November 2000, the United States repealed the FSC and put in its place the
“extraterritorial income (ETI)” regime. The ETI provisions consist of a tax benefit for exports
of the same magnitude as FSC, but also extend tax free treatment to a certain amount of
income from exporters’ foreign operations.  The partial tax exemption for extraterritorial
income is the design feature of the ETI provisions that is intended to achieve WTO
compliance.  However the EU maintains that the ETI provisions provide an export subsidy
in the same manner as FSC, and has asked the WTO to rule against it.  The EU also requested
the authority to impose $4 billion in retaliatory duties on U.S. goods, an amount 12 times
greater than the $300 million in punitive duties the U.S. imposed in the beef and banana cases.
An interim WTO report, which  was delivered to the United States and EU on June 22,
2000, indicated that the new law continues to provide export subsidies and also that it
provides less favorable treatment to imported products than that accorded U.S. made
products. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick called the report a “nuclear bomb.” 
The Bush Administration  opted to appeal the WTO ruling.  But the appeal was rejected
by the WTO on January 14, 2002, thereby leaving both sides with difficult choices. The
options for a settlement include U.S. efforts to enact further changes in its tax laws to
conform to WTO rules; U.S. offers of compensation to the EU for trade damages; U.S.
acceptance of EU trade retaliation; or efforts to settle the dispute in the context of the Doha
Round of trade negotiations consistent with the objective of clarifying the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Agreements.  While the last option perhaps is the most attractive, it
raises the question of what concessions the EU and other countries might demand in return..
 (For further discussion,  see CRS Report RS20746, Export Tax Benefits and the WTO).
Resolving Longstanding Disputes
The United States and EU are again engaged in disputes involving Airbus and steel.
These long-running skirmishes involve efforts by both Brussels and Washington to craft
policies that provide important producer interests with financial support and/or protection
from import competition.  Efforts to resolve both disputes are likely to continue throughout
this year.
Airbus Production Subsidies2
On December 19, 2000, Airbus announced that it had formally launched a program to
construct the world’s largest commercial passenger aircraft, the newly numbered Airbus
A380.  In the spring of 2001, Boeing dropped its support of a competing new large aircraft,
opting instead to focus on the development of a new class of higher speed commercial
aircraft.  The Airbus action potentially reopens a long-standing trade dispute between the
United States and Europe about subsidization of aircraft projects that compete directly with
non-subsidized U.S. products, in this case the Boeing 747 series aircraft. 
The large commercial aircraft (jet aircraft with 100 or more seats) production industry
is essentially a duopoly consisting of an American manufacturer, Boeing, and a European
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manufacturer, Airbus.  Until recently Airbus was a consortium of national aviation firms,
some with close government ties, who cooperated to produce commercial aircraft.  As a
result of recent European aerospace industry consolidation, Airbus is now owned by just two
firms, EADS and BAE systems.  Airbus itself is reforming as a public firm under the name
Airbus Integrated Company.  In recent years, after two decades of trying, Airbus has come
close to achieving parity in sales with Boeing.
The basic premise of the dispute between the U.S. and EU is whether, as U.S. trade
policymakers contend, Airbus is a successful participant in the market for large commercial
jet aircraft not because it makes competitive products, which by all standards it does, but
because it has received significant amounts of governmental subsidy and other assistance,
without which it probably would not have been able to enter and participate in the market.
Airbus, not surprisingly, does not accept the U.S. view of the reasons for its success.
At issue in the A380 development is at least $2.5 billion in already identified direct loans
to be provided to Airbus member firms by the governments of France, Germany, Spain and
the United Kingdom.  Additional funds are likely to be provided to subcontractors by other
European nations such as Belgium and Italy.    The United States is concerned that the level
of state-aid needed for this project could violate the 1992 Agreement on Government Support
for Civil Aircraft between the United States and the EU, which limits direct assistance to one-
third of development costs. The United States is also concerned that these loans will not be
on commercial rates and terms, and that they might be forgiven if the A380 is a commercial
failure.  
To date, the Bush Administration has not changed U.S. policy on this issue. At a June
6, 2001 meeting of the WTO Committee on Civil Aircraft, Bush Administration officials
pressed the EU for more information on the financing of the A380. The United States is
seeking information on the critical project appraisal - Airbus’ projections on costs and sales
of the A380.   In response, the EU raised questions concerning alleged subsidies Boeing
receives from the U.S. government and its dealings with the Department of Defense.(For
further discussion, see CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade,
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra1.shtml], Airbus and Competition Issues).
Steel Trade.3  Conflict over steel is again a high priority issue.  Although the EU
industry has undergone significant consolidation and privatization in recent years, the U.S.
government alleges that many EU companies still benefit from earlier state subsidies and/or
engage in dumping steel products  (selling at “less than fair value”) in foreign markets.  U.S.
steel companies have aggressively used U.S. trade laws to fight against EU steel imports by
filing antidumping and countervailing duty petitions that include imports from EU countries.
In return, the EU has countered with five recent challenges in the WTO against the alleged
U.S. misuse of its countervailing duty and antidumping laws. Moreover, the EU, along with
eight other petitioning countries, initiated on July 10, 2001 a WTO dispute resolution
complaint against the so-called  “Byrd” law, which allows duties collected under the U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes to be returned to the injured U.S. industry.  The
law was passed with major backing of the U.S. steel industry.  
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In addition to “unfair” trade disputes, President Bush announced June 5, 2001 that his
Administration would call upon the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to begin an
investigation on international trade in steel under Section 201 of U.S. trade law. He also
announced that he would seek multilateral negotiations with U.S. trading partners on
fundamental issues of global overcapacity and government subsidies.  The President was
reacting to continued problems in the U.S. steel industry, parts of which still have not
recovered from a major import surge in 1997-98.  The rise in imports to more than a quarter
of U.S. finished steel consumption was stimulated by financial crises in Asia, Latin America
and Russia, which reduced demand in those markets, and by the dramatically lower dollar-
equivalent prices for many foreign producers.  After a partial recovery in 1999-2000, the U.S.
industry has again been affected by imports rising to more than 20% of finished steel
consumption, record-high levels of semi-finished products and falling market demand and
prices.
Section 201 relief, often referred to as “safeguard,” provides for temporary  restrictions
on imports that have surged in such quantities as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury
to a domestic industry. The procedure is compatible with the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).  A Section 201 case does not in itself need to demonstrate dumping,
subsidization or other unfair practices by U.S. trading partners.  
The ITC in October determined that U.S. producers of about 80 percent of U.S.-made
steel are being injured by imports.  The decision does not automatically mean that quotas or
duties will be imposed on the products found to be causing the injury.  The decision is left to
the President, following recommendations from ITC on what remedy to impose.  This
decision is due by March 6, 2002.
European Union officials have indicated they would challenge any possible U.S. steel
restrictions as violations of Article 2.1 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement.  Reportedly, the
three main points that could be raised are the ITC’s methodology in defining product
categories, the period used by the ITC in evaluating whether domestic producers had been
injured, and misapplication of the injury standard. (For more discussion, see CRS Electronic
Briefing Book on Trade, [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra1.shtml],   Steel: Trade
and Industry Issues).
Dealing with Different Public Concerns Over New Technologies and
New Industries
The emergence of new technologies and new industries is at the heart of a growing
number of disputes. Biotechnology as a new technology and e-commerce (and related data
privacy concerns) as a new industry are emerging issues that have great potential for
generating increases in transatlantic welfare, as well as conflict.  The longstanding beef
hormone dispute can be viewed as a sub-set of the biotechnology controversy.   These issues
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Bio-technology.4   Differences between the United States and the EU over genetically
engineered (GE) crops and food products that contain them pose a potential threat to, and
in some cases have already disrupted, U.S. agricultural trade. Underlying the conflicts are
pronounced differences between the United States and EU about GE products and their
potential health and environmental effects.  
Widespread farmer adoption of bio-engineered crops in the United States makes
consumer acceptance of GE crops and foods at home and abroad critical to producers,
processors, and exporters.  U.S. farmers use GE crops because they can reduce input costs
or make field work more flexible.  Supporters of GE crops maintain that the technology also
holds promise for enhancing agricultural productivity and improving nutrition in developing
countries. U.S. consumers, with some exceptions, have been generally accepting of the health
and safety of GE foods and willing to put their trust in a credible regulatory process.
In contrast, EU consumers, environmentalists, and some scientists maintain that the long-
term effects of GE foods on health and the environment are unknown and not scientifically
established.  By and large, Europeans are more risk averse to the human health and safety
issues associated with bio-engineered food products than U.S. citizens.
 In 1999 the EU instituted a de facto moratorium on any new approval of GE products.
EU policymakers also moved toward establishing mandatory labeling requirements for
products containing GE ingredients. Subsequently, the EU has put in place legislation to
restart the process of approving GE crop varieties, but has yet to complete regulations on
labeling GE foods.  On July 25, 2001, the European Commission proposed stringent rules on
labeling and traceability of GM food and animal feed.  U.S. biotechnology, food, and
agriculture interests are concerned that these regulations, if adopted by the EU governments
and EU Parliament, will deny U.S. products entry into the EU market and may seek to
challenge them in the WTO.
The Bush Administration in late August 2001 reiterated its view that regulatory
approaches toward products of biotechnology should be transparent, predictable, and based
on sound science.  Moreover, the administration made clear that it would mount an aggressive
campaign against proposed EU labeling and traceability regulations by pressing the EU not
to adopt regulations that would violate WTO rules or hurt U.S. exports. On February 7,
2002, USTR Zoellick stated that the United States is “very strongly” considering filing a
formal dispute settlement complaint in the WTO over the EU’s failure to lift its moratorium
on imports of GMOs.  EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy countered that U.S. action
along these lines would be “immensely counterproductive” because it would be seen as a
challenge to “consumer fears and perceptions.”
Beef Hormones. The dispute over the EU ban, implemented in 1989, on the
production and importation of meat treated with growth-promoting hormones is one of the
most bitter disputes between the United States and Europe.  It is also a dispute, that on its
surface, involves a relatively small amount of trade.  The ban affected an estimated $100-$200
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million in lost U.S. exports –less than one-tenth of one percent of U.S. exports to the EU in
1999. 
The EU justified  the ban to protect the health and safety of consumers, but several WTO
dispute settlement panels subsequently ruled that the ban was inconsistent with the Uruguay
Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. The SPS Agreement provides criteria
that have to be met when a country imposes food safety import regulations more stringent
than those agreed upon in international standards. These include a scientific assessment that
the hormones pose a health risk, along with a risk assessment. Although the WTO panels
concluded that the EU ban lacked a scientific justification, the EU refused to remove the ban
primarily out of concern that European consumers were opposed to having this kind of meat
in the marketplace.
In lieu of lifting the ban, the EU in 1999 offered the United States compensation in the
form of an expanded quota for hormone-free beef. The U.S. government, backed by most of
the U.S. beef industry, opposed compensation on the grounds that exports of hormone-free
meat would not be large enough to compensate  for losses of hormone-treated exports.  This
led the way for the United States to impose 100% retaliatory tariffs on exports from mostly
France, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, countries deemed the biggest supporters of the ban.
The U.S. hard line is buttressed by concerns that other countries might adopt similar
measures based on health concerns that lack a legitimate scientific basis according to U.S.
standards. Other U.S. interest groups are concerned that non-compliance by the EU
undermines the future ability of the WTO to resolve disputes involving the use of SPS
measures.
Recent occurrences of  “mad cow disease” in several EU countries and the outbreak of
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and three other EU countries have
contributed to an environment that is not conducive to resolving the meat hormone dispute.
The EU has recently indicated its intention to make the ban on hormone-treated meat
permanent, while at the same time expressing some openness to renewing discussions about
a compensation arrangement which would increase the EU’s market access for non-hormone
treated beef from the United States.  In discussions held June 11, 2001, a U.S. industry
proposal for expanded access to the EU market for hormone-free beef for a period of 12
years was rejected by the EU. In response, the EU countered with a 4-5 year period for
compensation. The compensation talks have since languished .  But a February 20, 2002 EU
Standing Veterinary Committee proposal to repeal the requirement that 20 percent of beef
imported from the U.S. be tested for the presence of hormones could remove an important
obstacle in the compensation talks by making it easier for U.S. non-hormone beef producers
to take advantage of any improved market access conditions. 
In pursuing compensation talks, the Bush Administration is faced with a divided industry
position.  The American Meat Institute and the American Farm Bureau prefer carousel
retaliation to settle the dispute while the American Cattlemen’s Beef Association supports
efforts to gain increased access for non-hormone treated beef in exchange for dropping the
retaliatory tariff on EU exports. (For further discussion, see CRS Report RS20142, The
European Union’s Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat). 
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E-Commerce and Data Privacy.  E-commerce - the purchase and delivery of
products and services on-line - largely operates in a free trade environment. The United States
has pressed to extend a de facto WTO moratorium on taxing  e-commerce indefinitely.  The
EU, however, proposes that rules on sales of products and services over the Internet be
negotiated individually as new goods or services, a plan that U.S. negotiators believe would
allow Europeans to regulate Internet content by accepting Internet services in some areas and
not in others. The EU and its members rely on value-added taxes on sales for a major part of
their revenues and cannot easily contemplate exempting a new growth area of the economy.
The EU is currently close to adopting a directive and a regulation on applying value-
added-taxes (VAT) on digital goods and services. The Bush Administration on February 8,
2002 stated it has serious concerns about the proposed tax on the grounds that it may violate
the WTO obligation to accord national treatment to foreign goods and services..  
The related issue of consumer privacy rights is also a source of  friction.  While the EU
supports strict legal regulations on gathering consumer’s personal data, the United States has
advocated a self-regulated approach.  Controversy emerged when the EU adopted a directive
forbidding the commercial exchange of private information with countries that lack adequate
privacy protections. The issue appeared resolved by the “safe harbor” agreement  of 2000,
whereby U.S. companies that agree to abide by privacy principles can enter a safe harbor
protecting them from the EU directive barring data transfers to countries that do not
adequately protect citizens’ privacy. But  U.S. companies have been slow to join safe harbor,
and Congress is moving toward an examination of privacy legislation that potentially could
be based on standards quite different from the ones Europe applies. Moreover, the European
Parliament in early July 2001 passed a resolution calling for a renegotiation of the accord
because it failed to adequately protect consumer privacy.  (For further discussion, see
CRS Report RS20823, The EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement on Personal Data
Privacy).
Fostering a Receptive Climate for Mergers and
Acquisitions
Consistent with the trend of increased globalization, U.S. and
European companies have engaged in hundreds of mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) in recent years. In 1999 European companies
reportedly spent over $200 billion on acquisitions of U.S. companies
compared to U.S. company expenditures of $90 billion for European
companies.  Although concerns regarding foreign control and ownership
of companies in particular sectors, such as telecommunications or mass
media, have been raised  from time to time, M&A activity has been pretty
much noncontroversial. That was until July 3, 2001, the day the European
Commission blocked  the merger of General Electric and Honeywell,




As M&A  activity has accelerated in recent years among U.S. and
European companies, the U.S. Justice Department and the European
Union’s competition directorate have worked closely in passing judgment
on proposed deals.  Pursuant to a 1991 bilateral agreement on antitrust
cooperation between the European Commission and the United States, the
handling of these cases has been viewed generally as a successful example
of transatlantic cooperation. In reviews of several hundred  mergers over
the past 10 years, there has been substantial agreement between regulators
in Brussels and Washington on antitrust decisions. However, the EU’s
recent rejection of General Electric’s $43 billion merger with Honeywell
International has highlighted major differences in antitrust standards and
processes employed by the EU and the United States.  In the process, some
observers have argued that the GE-Honeywell case points to a need for
closer consultations or convergence in antitrust standards.
The GE-Honeywell merger would have combined producers of
complementary aircraft components. GE produces aircraft engines and
Honeywell makes advanced avionics such as  airborne collision warning
devices and navigation equipment. GE and Honeywell do not compete over
any large range of products.  The combined company arguably would have
been able to offer customers (mostly Boeing and Airbus) lower prices for
a  package that no other engine or avionics company could match. In its
review, the U.S. Justice Department concluded that the merger would offer
better products and services at more attractive prices than either firm could
offer individually, and that  competition would be enhanced. 
With regard to the European Commission’s   merger review (which
occurs over any merger between firms whose combined global sales are
more than $4.3 billion and that do at least $215 million of business in the
European Union), the legal standard employed  for evaluating mergers is
whether the acquisition creates or strengthens a company’s dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded.  The commission’s Task Force on Mergers concluded  that,
together,  GE-Honeywell’s  “dominance” would be increased because of
the strong positions held by GE in jet engines and by Honeywell in
avionics products. 
 
 EU antitrust regulators relied, in part,  on the economic concept of
“bundling” to reach its decision. Bundling is the practice of selling
complementary products in a single, discounted package.  The combined
company makes more profits than the pre-merger companies and  prices
are lower, making consumers better off.  But the EU concluded that the
lower prices and packages of products that could be offered by the merged
entity would make competition a lot more difficult for other producers of
airplane equipment such as Rolls Royce, Pratt& Whitney, and United
Technologies.  In the long run, European regulators had concerns that  the
merger could force  weaker competitors out of the market, thereby leaving




GE officials countered that the commission relied on a theory that  is
not supported by evidence, particularly in the aerospace industry. Boeing
and Airbus, for example, tend not to be weak or passive price takers, but
are strong and sophisticated customers that negotiate all prices. And even
if the new company offered discounted “bundled” packages, the winners
would be the airlines and, ultimately,  their customers.   
In short, the GE-Honeywell case crystallized differences in standards
and processes employed by antitrust regulators in Washington and
Brussels. One of the most striking differences is that the European process
clearly affords competitors more leeway to oppose mergers by allowing for
testimony behind closed doors and places more weight on economic
models that predict competition will be reduced and competitors
eliminated in the long-run.   U.S. antitrust regulators tend to presume that
any post-merger anti-competitive problems can be taken care of later by
corrective antitrust enforcement action. Whether this kind of divergence in
antitrust approaches should be addressed in future negotiations or is an
aberration in an otherwise mostly cooperative process remains to be seen.
Strengthening the Multilateral Trading System
After three years of efforts, including the ill-fated ministerial held in Seattle in 1999,
trade ministers from the 142 member countries of the WTO agreed to launch a new round of
trade negotiations last November in Doha, Qatar.  At Doha the WTO members agreed to
launch a new round of trade negotiations and agreed to give priority attention to a number
of developing country concerns.
By most accounts, U.S.-EU cooperation played a major role in producing agreement at
Doha.  USTR Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Lamy reportedly worked closely
together, agreeing that making concessions to developing countries on issues of priority
concern was necessary to move the trading system forward.  Their cooperation began early
in 2001 with the settlement of the long-running banana dispute and tacit agreement to settle
other disputes without resort to retaliation.  Each also recognized that both trading
superpowers would have to make concessions at Doha to achieve their overall objectives.
At Doha, the EU eventually yielded to U.S. demands for s strong negotiating mandate
to reduce agricultural exports. In return, U.S. negotiators supported EU efforts for
negotiations on the environment, investment, and competition policy.  Absent these balancing
efforts, neither side would have been able to accept or promote the Doha agreement.  
Accommodating Foreign Policy Sanctions That Have an
Impact on Trade
U.S. legislation that requires the imposition of economic sanctions for
foreign policy reasons has been a major concern of the EU.  While the EU
often shares many of the foreign policy goals of the United States that are
addressed legislatively, it has opposed the extraterritorial provisions of
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certain pieces of U.S. legislation that seek to unilaterally regulate or
control trade and investment activities conducted by foreign companies
outside the United States.  Most  persistent EU complaints have been
directed at the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (so-
called Helms-Burton Act) and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),
which threatens the extraterritorial imposition of U.S. sanctions against
European firms doing business in Cuba, Iran, and Libya. 
In May 1998 the EU reached an understanding with the Clinton
Administration concerning Helms-Burton and ILSA.  Regarding Helms-
Burton, the Clinton Administration agreed to continue to waive Title III (at
six month intervals, as allowed by law), which allows lawsuits for damages
in U.S. courts over investment in expropriated U.S.  property in Cuba, in
order to avoid a major dispute with the EU.  The Clinton Administration
also pledged to work with Congress to amend the law’s provision (Title
IV) barring entry into the United States of executives working for
companies that have invested in property confiscated by the  Cuban
government.  This permanent waiver of Title IV would be undertaken in
exchange for the EU’s efforts to promote democracy and human rights in
Cuba. The understanding also tried to insulate the EU from sanctions
under ILSA, which threatened sanctions on foreign oil companies that
invest more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector, or $40
million in one year in Libya’s energy sector.  
EU Commissioner for External Affairs Christopher Patten called on
the Bush Administration to endorse the 1998 understanding at a March 6,
2001 press conference.  President Bush, in turn, on July 16, 2001 waived
Title III of Helms-Burton for  six months, and called on the EU and the
international community to work with the United States for free speech,
free elections, and respect for human rights in Cuba.  Concerning ILSA,
the House and Senate both passed bills (H.R. 1954, S. 1218) extending
ILSA for an additional five years.  H.R. 1954, also provides for termination
of the bill with the passage of a joint resolution of the Congress. (For
further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran-Libya Sanction Act
(ILSA), by Kenneth Katzman.
LEGISLATION
In the 107th Congress, there has been no legislation introduced to date that
specifically addresses U.S.-EU trade relations.  However, legislation has
been introduced on the disparate matters of  biotechnology, steel, and
renewal of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act – all of which could affect
trans-Atlantic ties. These bills are noted below.
H.R. 115 (Holt)
A bill to provide for a program of public education about




A bill that requires the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct, through the
National Academy of Sciences, a report on the safety and monitoring of
GE foods.
H.R. 808 (Visclosky)
A bill to require the President to establish import quotas on steel
products for five years, with monthly imports not to exceed the average of
the three-year period leading up to the mid-1997 import surge.  
H.R. 1954 (Gilman)
A bill to extend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 until 2006.
Reported out of the House International Relations Committee on June 20,
2001 by a vote of 41-3. Passed the House July 26 by a vote of 409 to 6.
S. 994 (Schumer)
A bill to amend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and to
extend authorities under that Act. Passed the Senate on July 25 by a vote
of 96 to 2.  
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